The Many Challenges of North Africa: Understanding the Algerian Role in Regional Security
On Monday, the 23rd of December 2019, the news agency Algeria Press Service released a press dispatch announcing the sudden death from a heart attack of the de facto leader of Algeria, Ahmed Gaid Salah. Only four days before, the newly elected but highly contested President of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, Adbelmajid Tebboune took office and, as a first measure, decorated Gaid Salah - the Chief of Staff of the People’s National Army - with the top honour of the National Order of Merit. The Lieutenant that ruled over Algeria saw in Mr. Tebboune, ‘the man able to lead Algeria to a better future’. This tragic event illustrates the seemingly new regime that claims to put an end to the military rule over the country. Between wills of change and political dramas, what is the Algerians’ place in regional governance? What are the strategic challenges that the North African power and its new regime will have to face in the pursuit of regional peace and stability?
Algeria and the Many Challenges of North Africa
Strategically located on the Mediterranean coastline, holding the highest Human Development Index of continental Africa and covering the largest national area in both Africa and the Arab World, Algeria has imposed itself as an unavoidable security actor in North Africa. The 2019 mass protests put all eyes back on this keystone country, as a part of the process of maintaining international peace and security in this unstable region. The challenges that the North African power has to face are of various natures, ranging from coping with the Malian and Libyan crises to controlling upcoming migrations from the Sahel region towards Europe, and tackling terrorism. In addition, the democratic challenge that has been gathering millions of Algerian each Friday of the last eight months makes the balance of powers in the region even more unstable.
In order to provide a panoramic understanding of the dynamics of Algeria in regional security, this article will first critically assess the military and political profile of the country before examining the Algerian involvement in matters of conflict-solving and counterterrorism in North Africa, with a special emphasis put on the ongoing Malian crisis. Finally, a brief thought on the possible future scenarios regarding security problems at stake in the region such as migrations in the prism of Algerian politics will be then proposed to the reader. Under no circumstances does this work attempt to achieve anything but to neutrally describe the situation in this country. It does not constitute a position in favor of any cause or point of view.
Wielding the Carrot and the Stick: A Heavily-Armed but Rethinkable Regime
Just like Soviet countries back in the Cold War, Algeria enjoys a heavy military that concentrates all the efforts on the political power at the cost of public investments in public health, education or even energetic transition. Salient is the fact that of all arms imported by African states, 54% account for Algeria alone, well ahead of its Morroccan neighbour and Nigeria. Relying on the most important proven reserves of oil in North Africa, Algeria has chosen to dedicate 5.7% of its annual GDP to military expenditures.
The regime entertains strong and long-term military partnerships with playmakers of the international security scene. Algeria ranks among the top destinations of the Russian Federation’s military exports, third only to India and China. As of March 2019, 66% of all weapons imported in the North African country are fabricated in the Eurasian power, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute reports. In addition to the privileged Russian partnership that dates back to the Cold War, China, Italy as well as Germany are also important suppliers of the Algerian military.
Many claims among the Algerian population have emerged during recent years and partly explain the 2019 mass protests. Last July, the French-speaking daily newspaper El Watan (meaning ‘the Homeland’ in Arabic) published an article entitled ‘Democracy in Algeria: End of Privileges with a Corrupted Regime’. According to the widely-read newspaper and other analysts, the role of the military is prevalent in the country and should be reduced. To a relative extent, bearing in mind all the frustrations that could be addressed towards the government, one must acknowledge the fact that press independence is more or less preserved in the country, as shows the critical stance of popular newspapers. Regarding the involvement of citizens in politics, many analysts underscore the process of ‘depoliticisation of the citizenry’ (1). It is worth highlighting that during recent years, the government has shown some signs of good will, taking into account popular requests. Examples include the February 2016 long-awaited constitutional recognition of Berber as an official language of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria alongside with Arabic; or the creation, by the executive power, of two commissions dedicated to ensuring a democratic control of elections: National Commission for Election Supervision and the Independent National Commission for the Surveillance of Legislative Elections (2), which effectiveness can be questioned.
Conveyed by social media and direct talks between citizens, the 2019 protests demonstrate a more active role of the population that first of all aims to reshape the democratic system in a more comprehensive and inclusive framework. In other words, Algerians seem to be driven by a will to experiment with a new form of democracy on behalf of representativeness in the two senses of the term: that is, to be both the reflection and the voice of the population.
Protesters in Algiers, unhappy with the political system. June 14, 2019 (Reuters/Ramzi Boudina (source)
A North African Power Involved in Regional Security and Conflict Resolution: the Malian Example
Following the neoliberal methodology of International Relations, foreign policy making is for a great part driven by domestic politics and norms (3). As such, this section will try to understand through the Malian conflict how the Algerian deciders shape the nature of the policy on regional security and terrorism.
Since 1962, and as a result of the war against colonialism, the Algerian foreign policy has relied on two essential principles: non-interfering in other countries’ domestic politics and using military force only to protect borders while preferring negotiations to solve conflicts (4). One would remind the pivotal role of Algerian diplomacy during the Cold War as shown by the solving of the Tehran hostage crisis with the 1981 Algiers Accords, which Point I was entitled ‘Non-Intervention In Iranian Affairs’ (5). One should also bear in mind the importance of the Cold War in the understanding of the two mantras, to the extent that this period and its global dynamics contributed to building the fundamentals of the Algerian diplomacy. The US-Iranian example illustrates the foreign policy leitmotiv of the country: that is, to act as a mediator and to support non-meddling in domestic affairs of foreign powers while refusing military intervention.
The conflict in Mali has to be analysed in order to understand the contemporary offshoot of this diplomatic tradition. Algeria has been endorsing the role of ‘the Leader of Mediation’ (‘Chef de file de la Médiation’) (6) between the Government of Mali and the Azawad separatist movement. In accordance to the role of mediator that the Berber country likes to endorse, a ceasefire between the two camps has been agreed upon and signed in the Mediterranean capital in 2015 (7), in what is now also known as the Algiers Accords. The agreement called for the respect of national sovereignty and peaceful dialogue in Mali. Moreover, in the matter of dealing with cross borders terrorism, Algeria also opts for bilateral cooperation. That is why a Mali-Algeria summit is held frequently, either in Bamako or Algiers in order to provide a comprehensive framework of cooperation in intelligence and counterterrorism in the Sahara desert. Likewise, the Comité d’Etat-major Opérationnel Conjoint (CEMOC), based in the southern city of Tamanrasset, aimed to secure a deserted area expanding to Mali, Mauritania and Niger. But with the France-led Operation Barkhane, this initiative became somewhat secondary and quite ineffective.
Although idealist, as any accord, the 2015 Algiers Accords as well as multilateral initiatives illustrate the Algerian paradox: even if the country has the military ability to intervene and could have the legitimacy to do so, it elected not to. However, it should be reminded that Algeria enjoys a high-class secret service and counterterrorism section of the military, that have proven since the end of a decade-long fight with the now defeated Islamist insurgency - but also the 9/11 attacks, its effectiveness when operating against terrorism within the national borders (8). As such, in November 2019 in the region of Ghardaia, Algerian Defence Ministry arrested a group of eight Islamist militants planning to join terrorist groups in Mali (9).
Algeria of Today, Algeria of Tomorrow: What’s Next, Except Uncertainty?
The Algerian strategic potential is merely unmatched in the world. Should it be because of its geography - Algeria is a pivotal crossing point for trade and migrations; the richness of its cultural heritage - that is the meeting of every Mediterranean civilisation; the unity of its people; the resources of its subsoil. But years of mismanagement as well as the infamous ‘lost decade’ of the 1990s have jeopardised the growth and openness of this regional power. Among the reasons for the non-take-off of the Algerian economy is the lack of diversification. Indeed, around 95% of Algeria’s exports originate from petroleum, making the national economy vulnerable to low oil prices, and more largely to international context, despite a low level of debt. Algeria has to diversify its economy and exports in order to resist an external shock and establish a stable growth. Economic fields such as tourism and tertiary sectors have to be developed by the political power.
Algeria’s exports are almost only composed by hydrocarbures. The country needs to diversify its economy (source: The Observatory of Economic Complexity) (source)
Regarding regional affairs, some auspicious signs can be observed. Albeit distrustful towards the regime, the Algerian population is still showing support to the military and the diplomatic role of its representatives. The Malian example along with the Libyan crisis, tend to demonstrate that Algeria’s commitment for dialogue remains constant. An unanswered question subsists however. Is Algeria ready to cope with the overwhelming upcoming migrations flows coming from Sahel and Sub Saharan Africa? How will Europe manage to convince Maghreb countries - of which Algeria is the largest - to anticipate the decade to come?
Finally, an Algerian revival cannot ignore the demands of the 2019 protests. The refusal of a fifth presidential mandate of Mr Bouteflika is first of all a call for democracy and transparency. Algerians do not necessarily reject the former Cold-War icon but rather the institutional system as a whole, which is widely considered as sclerotic and corrupted. Despite auspicious signs for democracy, the proposals emanating from the government remain unsatisfying for the population. The regime needs to seriously take into consideration the will for democracy and the right to dignity and act accordingly in order to achieve social peace. If not, who knows if the country is ready to face political division and social partition, so deeply needed in this period? Things might look somewhat gloomy but let us daydream when watching all the population united under the Desert Foxes winning the African Football Cup. As put by a young Algerian supporter in Paris ‘unity is possible in Algeria and nothing is impossible for Algerians.’ Hopefully, the future will prove the optimistic young man right.
The victorious Algerian football squad contributed to maintain a national unity amidst tense political context in 2019. (source)
References:
1. Yahia H. Zoubir & Ahmed Aghrout, Algeria: Reforms Without Change? in Zoubir, Yahia H & White Gregory, eds., North African Politics: Change And Continuity, (London: Routledge, 2016), p. 146.
3. Helen V. Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997).
4. Akram Belkaïd, ‘Pourquoi l’Algérie n’intervient-elle pas militairement en Libye et dans le Sahel ?’ in L’Algérie, Un Pays Empêché, (Paris: Tallandier, 2019), p. 298.
8. Kal Ben Khalid, ‘Evolving Approaches in Algerian Security Cooperation’, Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel, Vol. 8, Issue 6, June 2015.
Edited by Hiba Arrame
